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This study considers the importance of firm characteristics in explaining the degree of 
business constraints facing Pakistani firms in the Investment Climate Survey.   We quantify 
how firms with differing characteristics experience particular problems.  After controlling for 
other factors, the largest differences in responses to business constraints occur among firms 
that vary by manufacturing industry, and among firms operating under different ownership 
structures or selling in different markets.  In some cases, firm size and firm location also play 
an important role.  The age of the firm generally does not lead to significant differences.  These 
results account for the heterogeneity of firms better than others, and may be important for 
policy-makers to develop more specific approaches to fostering the investment climate.  
JEL classification:  O53, L6, M0 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
What  is  the  key  to  a  country’s  economic  development?   This  question  has 
produced great controversy and a wide variety of answers.  In recent years, the answers 
have increasingly emphasised  the microeconomic institutions of  a country: is there a 
strong legal system to promote property rights, is corruption under control, can financial 
institutions play their role as intermediaries between savers and investors, and so forth?  
In  this  new  analytical  framework,  macroeconomic  stability  is  not  sufficient  for 
development.   It is along these lines that the most multilateral development institutions 
now  place  an  increasing  focus  on  improving  the  business  or  investment  climate.   A 
country  cannot  be  expected  to  grow  and  flourish  if  potential  entrepreneurs  see  no 
incentive to taking risks and expanding their businesses.   Risk taking must provide the 
potential  for  rewards,  but  rewards  can  be  almost  nonexistent  without  the  appropriate 
microeconomic institutions.  
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In order to analyse the investment climate, the World Bank commissioned surveys 
for  53  countries.   In  the  case  of  Pakistan,  an  Investment  Climate  Assessment  (ICA) 
survey was administered in 2002 in conjunction with the Small and Medium Enterprise 
Development  Authority  (SMEDA),  Pakistan.   This  survey  of  956  firms  is  the  most 
extensive for Pakistan and will be the subject of our analysis.  It is not the only survey of 
Pakistani businesses though, as more limited surveys were used to understand business 
constraints  in  World  Bank  (2001a),  SMEDA  (2002),  and  Bari,  et  al.  (2002),  among 
others. 
Of course, the businesses of Pakistan are not homogenous units.  They vary along 
a number of important dimensions, including their size, location, exporter status, type of 
production, age, and type of ownership.   However, while previous studies have made 
attempts  to  understand  business  constraints  in  Pakistan,  they  have  not  included  a 
systematic  effort  to  understand  the  heterogeneity  of  Pakistani  firms  relating  to  these 
various constraints.  Many discussions of policy reform tend to imply a one-policy-fits-all 
approach.   Some of these studies make initial attempts along these lines by tabulating 
their  results based  on  firm size  or  geographical region.   But  this is not  sufficient to 
understand  the  differences  in  constraints  and  we  are  often  left  to  wonder  what 
characteristic  of  the  firm  (its  size  or  its  location)  is  driving  the  difference  in  firm 
responses.   
Our  goal  in  this  paper  is  to  provide  a  more  systematic  analysis  of  how  the 
characteristics  of  a  firm  affect  its  responses  to  questions  about  various  business 
constraints, in order to contribute to the discussion of reform efficacy in Pakistan.   We 
accomplish this by using an ordered probit analysis.   The reported degree of constraint 
facing a business is the dependent variable to be explained by a number of underlying 
firm  characteristics,  including  firm  size,  province,  exporter  status,  type  of  firm 
production, firm age, and the type of firm ownership.  This regression analysis makes it 
possible to know whether firm size, for example, leads to significantly different responses 
about firm constraints after controlling for the other firm characteristics.   By knowing 
this,  we  can  gain  more  insight  when  interpreting  the  cross-tabulations  of  business 
constraints by different firm characteristics.  This will allow for a more detailed analysis 
of Pakistan’s business or investment climate, and perhaps even uncover further areas for 
reforms in the Pakistan economy. 
As shared above, for the purpose of this paper, the Investment Climate Survey 
2002 dataset has been analysed and our analysis proceeds as follows.
1   In Section 2, we 
provide background about previous studies of the Pakistan business climate, as well as 
motivate how the trend toward microeconomic institutional focus developed.  Section 3 
follows with a description of the Pakistan ICA and summary statistics for the sample 
firms.   Section  4  explains  the  methodology  of  the  ordered  probit  model  approach.  
Section  5  provides  the  results,  and  Section  6  follows  with  conclusions  and  policy 
recommendations.   Briefly, our findings suggest that a firm’s characteristics plays an 
important role in determining its responses to different business constraints in Pakistan.   
1In 2006, the World Bank and SMEDA began work on the Investment Climate Assessment II for 
Pakistan.  This survey was expected to be released in 2008, but it has not yet been cleared for use by private 
researchers.  Subsequent research will consider this survey as well.  It will be interesting to study the ICA II, 
because questions about business constraints are asked several times to check for consistency in the answers, 
and firms are also asked to rank the biggest three constraints and the three most needed reforms. Firm Heterogeneity and Constraints to Development  3
 
Firms that differ by export status, by the type of sub-manufacturing industry, and by firm 
ownership status, provide significantly different responses about the degree of business 
constraints.   Exporters enjoy better conditions, as do firms in the sports goods, leather 
goods, and electronics industries.  Meanwhile, private limited companies face additional 
burdens than other types of firm ownership structures.  In some cases, firm size and firm 
location also play an important role.   Medium size firms generally face more difficult 
conditions, as do firms in Sindh or Punjab.   Finally, firm age does not generally play 
much role in determining firm responses.    
2.  BACKGROUND 
During  the  1980s  and  1990s,  the  World  Bank  (WB)  and  the  International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) designed the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) to assist 
economic development by providing credit for debt-ridden countries. Under World Bank 
and  IMF  conditionality,  the  SAP  dominated  economic  policy  planning  in  many 
developing countries. A typical SAP facility required the recipient country to restructure 
its economy  in  order  to  reduce deficits and  yield financial resources required  to pay 
debts.  The  prescribed  macroeconomic  framework  included  “structural”  reforms  to 
deregulate the economy, liberalise trade and investment, and privatise state enterprises. 
These  were  coupled  with  short-term  stabilisation  measures,  including  cutbacks  in 
government  expenditures,  increased  interest  rates,  and  currency  devaluation.  The 
widespread failure of SAP  in  most of  the low  and  middle income countries to  yield 
sustainable moderate growth, as discussed in World Bank (2001b), prompted a paradigm 
shift even within the World Bank toward a broader economic development approach. 
Policy-makers  realised  that  alongside  deregulation,  trade  liberalisation,  and  fiscal 
discipline, microeconomic incentives are equally important to firm development and to 
stimulate private sector growth. 
As such, the World Bank has increasingly focused on microeconomic incentives in 
recent years.  James Wolfensohn, then president of the World Bank, developed the New 
Development Framework in 1999.   His approach de-emphasised macroeconomic issues 
and moved the focus to fighting corruption, to creating an effective justice system, and to 
promoting a supervised financial system.   There is only so much that macroeconomic 
stability can provide if a country’s institutions are not designed to effectively facilitate 
investment and growth.   
The World Bank’s World Development Report 2005 describes the World Bank’s 
efforts to understand the investment climate in low and middle income countries.   The 
report analyses survey data from 26,000 firms in 53 developing countries, in order to 
examine the relationship between the investment climate and growth.  These surveys are 
conducted with local partners in each country, in order to include local input for policy 
reforms.  The purpose of these investment climate surveys is to identify areas for policy 
reform that can reduce the burden on business and encourage them to invest and expand, 
with the idea that such growth will lessen poverty for everyone.  The World Bank seeks 
to define how certain economic policy measures have the ability to unleash the growth 
potential of a country or otherwise restrain it from growing.  
The  World  Bank,  in  collaboration  with  the  Small  and  Medium  Enterprise 
Development  Authority  (SMEDA)  of  Pakistan,  produced  an  investment  climate Moghal and Pfau  4
 
assessment for Pakistan in 2003.  The World Bank (2003) concluded that Pakistan needs 
to focus on microeconomic reforms to reduce business costs by providing better services 
in the areas of “power, telecom, tax administration, access to finance, and law and order” 
(p. iv).  The World Bank’s assessment focused on comparing various summary statistics 
from  the  survey  to  the  situation  in  other  comparable  countries,  mainly  China, 
Bangladesh, and India.  More detailed work was recently published as Dollar, Hallward-
Driemeier, and Mengistae (2005).   Table 1 compares the percentage of firms ranking a 
constraint as major or severe for these four countries.   Generally, Bangladesh faces a 
more  severe  situation  than  Pakistan,  but  Pakistan’s  firms  have  more  complaints  than 
those  in  China  or  India.   While  such  analysis  is  important,  as  a  comparison  to 
international benchmarks is needed to be able to quantify the severity of problems in 
Pakistan,  there  are  still  plenty  of  insights  beyond  the  scope  of  the  World  Bank’s 
assessment remaining to be learned from the survey results.  
Table 1 
Investment Climate Indicators in Four Countries  
(Percentage of Firms Ranking Constraint as Major or Very Severe) 
Constraint  Pakistan  Bangladesh
 
China  India 
Tax Administration  47.0%  50.7%  26.7%  26.4% 
Tax Rates  46.8%  35.8%  36.8%  27.9% 
Financing  40.8%  45.7%  22.3%  19.2% 
Economic Policy Uncertainty  40.4%  45.4%  32.9%  20.9% 
Corruption  40.3%  57.9%  27.3%  37.4% 
Electricity  39.3%  73.2%  29.7%  28.9% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder  21.4%  39.4%  20.0%  15.6% 
Labour Regulations  15.8%  10.8%  20.7%  16.7% 
Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers  13.0%  19.8%  30.7%  12.5% 
Source: For Pakistan, own calculations from Pakistan ICA.  For others, World Bank (2004b).  
While the World Bank’s assessment is able to use the most comprehensive survey 
available for Pakistani businesses, there have also been other analyses of the business 
situation. Of these, Bari, et al. (2002) is the most thorough, though they rely on a more 
limited survey of 54 firms to base their conclusions.  These authors develop the notion of 
a “binding constraint” as a way to target the problems most affecting firm growth and 
investment,  noting  the  need  to  focus  on  microeconomic  as  well  as  macroeconomic 
problems.  They also do their best to obtain a good representation of firm sizes in several 
manufacturing and retail sectors.   The binding constraints they observe include issues 
related  to  financing,  infrastructure,  government  regulation,  human  resources,  market 
regulations, and macroeconomic uncertainty.   
In a separate study, World Bank (2001a) uses a larger survey of 500 firms to 
identify the severity of constraints based on firm perceptions.  Their two-tiered approach 
first identifies the top ten problems experienced by firms in their efforts to grow, and then 
further investigates seven of these constraints.  The analysis is limited to the presentation 
of summary statistics based on enterprise perception. Nevertheless, the unique feature 
was  the  larger  representation  of  smaller  size  firms  in  the  survey  from  the  all  major 
economic sectors, including industry, trade, and services. Firm Heterogeneity and Constraints to Development  5
 
Finally,  a  key  early  paper  that  helped  begin  the  debate  on  SME  policy  in 
Pakistan  is  SMEDA  (2002).   They  survey  333  firms  in  order  to  develop  a  set  of 
policies for micro, small and medium enterprises.  They give special attention to the 
necessary  legislation  and  administrative  steps  for  compliance.  The  distinctive 
contribution of this study is to identify important issues related to labour welfare and 
taxation laws. The study further helps to clarify the complications faced by smaller 
firms in their attempts to comply with these laws.   The study maintains an overall 
focus on three broad issues, which included labour laws, business credit or enterprise 
financing, and taxation.  
3.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
We will provide a more detailed analysis of business constraints in Pakistan, using 
the  Investment  Climate  Survey  of  Pakistan  2002.   The  data  consists  of  956  firms 
interviewed in Pakistan by the Small and Medium Enterprise Development Authority of 
the Government of Pakistan in collaboration with the World Bank between May and 
November 2002.  The firms were sampled randomly from a sample frame drawn from the 
directories of registered businesses published by each of the four provincial government 
labour departments. The published directories were updated in 2000 and disaggregated in 
terms of employment and industrial sub-sectors. This allows the survey sample to be 
fairly representative of industrial activity in Pakistan’s twelve largest cities for seven 
manufacturing industries chosen in terms of their contribution to GDP.  The ICA is the 
largest  dataset  available,  and  care  was  taken  to  make  it  representative  of  Pakistan’s 
business  enterprise  population  as  described  in  Pakistan’s  Economic  Census  of  2001.  
Because of its size and scope, the dataset is rich enough to allow an extensive look at the 
heterogeneity of firms, and how this heterogeneity contributes to firm responses about 
business constraints. 
Table  2  provides  summary  statistics  for  the  firm  characteristics  in  the  survey 
sample.  Firm size includes four categories based on the number of workers employed at 
the  firm.
2   Micro  firms  employ  1  to  9  workers,  while  small  firms  employ  10  to  49 
workers, medium firms employ 50 to 99 workers, and large firms have 100 or more 
workers.  Micro firms account for 13.2 percent of the sample.  Meanwhile, small firms 
represent 58.6 percent of the total, medium firms another 14.7 percent, and large firms 
account for 13.5 percent.  With regard to Pakistan’s four provinces, Punjab accounts for 
60.7 percent of the firms in the survey, while 25 percent are in Sindh, 7.9 percent in 
NWFP, and 6.4 percent in Balochistan.
3   Meanwhile, 18.7 percent of the firms in the 
survey export at least some of their product.    
2These firm size definitions are based on the continuing discussions for the proposed SME Policy of 
Pakistan.   For details, please see SME Issues Paper and SME policy task force reports as available on the 
website www.smepolicy.net.pk 
3The results of the Economic Census of 2005 also suggest similar geographic patterns of industrial 
establishments, though we find that Sindh and Balochistan are overrepresented.  Punjab is home to six of the 
most industrialised cities and 68.4 percent of Pakistan’s 583,000 industrial establishments. Sindh, the home of 
Pakistan’s largest industrial city Karachi, includes 13.9 percent of industrial establishments, while there are 16 
percent in NWFP, and 1.4 percent in Balochistan. Moghal and Pfau  6
 
Table 2 
Description of Survey Data  
Number of Firms  Percent of Firms 
Firm Size     
 
Micro  126  13.2%  
Small  560  58.6%  
Medium  141  14.7%  
Large  129  13.5% 
Province      
Sindh  239  25.0%  
NWFP  76  7.9%  
Punjab  580  60.7%  
Balochistan  61  6.4% 
Exporter Status      
No Exports  777  81.3%  
Exports  179  18.7% 
Type of Production      
Textiles  342  35.8%  
Garments  136  14.2%  
Leather and Leather Products  40  4.2%  
Food Processing  151  15.8%  
Electronics and Electrical Equipment  101  10.6%  
Chemicals  138  14.4%  
Sports Goods  46  4.8%  
Other  2  0.2% 
Firm Age      
0-5 Years  96  10.0%  
6–10 Years  285  29.8%  
11–15 Years  228  23.8%  
16 + Years  347  36.3% 
Firm Ownership      
Publicly Listed Company  32  3.3%  
Private Held, Limited Company  486  50.8%  
Partnership  167  17.5%  
Sole Proprietorship  255  26.7%  
Other  16  1.7% 
Source: Own calculations from Pakistan Investment Climate Assessment.  
Furthermore,  the  firms  surveyed  are  involved  in  a  variety  of  manufacturing 
industries.  These  industries  include  textiles  (35.8  percent),  food  processing  (15.8 
percent),  chemicals  (14.4  percent),  garments  (14.2  percent),  electronics  and  electrical 
equipment (10.6 percent), sporting goods (4.8 percent), leather and leather products (4.2 
percent),  and  two  other  firms  that  were  not  classified.   With  regard  to  firm age,  10 
percent of firms are between 0 and 5 years old, while 29.8 percent of firms are 6 to 10 
years old, 23.8 percent of firms are 11 to 15 years old, and 36.3 percent of firms are at Firm Heterogeneity and Constraints to Development  7
 
least 16 years old.  Finally, the formal ownership structure of the firm is also important.  
In this regard, the more formal firms, publicly listed or privately held limited companies, 
together  make  up  54.1  percent  of  the  surveyed  firms.   Sole  proprietorships  and 
partnerships provide 44.2 percent of the sample, and other categories represent another 
1.7 percent.  
4.  METHODOLOGY 
Our goal is to understand the constraints facing Pakistani business. The business 
constraints in Pakistan will be considered along several different lines.  Important among 
these are the size of the firm, the location of the firm, whether the firm is an exporter, the 
type of goods produced by the firm, the age of the firm, and the type of firm ownership.  
We  attempt  to  understand  these  constraints  through  a system of  self-reporting  in  the 
Investment  Climate  Assessment  (ICA)  of  Pakistan.   The  ICA  asked  firms  to  rank 
seventeen different business obstacles on a scale with five categories ranging from “No 
Obstacle” to “Very Severe Obstacle.”   Table 3 shows how the 956 firms responded to 
each constraint.  The list of constraints is provided in descending order for the sum of the 
“major obstacle” and “very severe obstacle” categories.   We consider the results of the 
survey questions asking how severely constraining are various possible impediments to 
Pakistani business. This discussion will allow for a characterisation of the problems most 
affecting business in Pakistan.  
Table 3 
Firm Responses to Business Obstacles 
Constraints  None  Minor  Moderate
 
Major  Very Severe 
Tax Administration  24.40%  11.20%  17.40%  17.30%  29.70% 
Tax Rates  25.40%  9.40%  18.40%  15.30%  31.50% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates)  26.30%  13.10%  17.40%  13.60%  29.60% 
Economic Policy Uncertainty  29.50%  11.20%  18.90%  14.20%  26.20% 
Corruption  28.60%  12.00%  19.10%  15.10%  25.20% 
Electricity  21.30%  20.10%  19.30%  16.60%  22.70% 
Access to Financing (Collateral)  29.60%  12.50%  19.60%  15.90%  22.40% 
Macro-economic Instability  30.40%  13.60%  21.60%  14.60%  19.90% 
Customs and Trade Regul.  43.80%  14.10%  17.70%  12.70%  11.70% 
Anti-competitive Practices  37.20%  19.60%  21.80%  8.70%  12.80% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder  44.80%  17.40%  16.40%  10.20%  11.20% 
Access to Land  46.40%  16.80%  15.70%  10.10%  11.10% 
Labour Regulations  43.80%  17.40%  23.00%  10.20%  5.70% 
Business Permits  52.60%  17.30%  15.40%  8.00%  6.70% 
Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers  48.30%  19.90%  18.90%  7.60%  5.30% 
Transportation  46.40%  23.60%  19.90%  6.50%  3.70% 
Telecommunications  53.90%  25.60%  12.90%  4.20%  3.50% 
Source: Own calculations from Pakistan Investment Climate Assessment. 
Note: Constraints in the shaded part of the Table are “binding,” as defined in Section 4. Moghal and Pfau  8
 
We employ the concept of “binding constraint” to identify those constraints which 
produce the largest complaints from firms.  Following the approach of Bari, et al. (2002), we 
use two criteria for determining a binding constraint: the median firm response must identify 
the constraint as at least a “moderate obstacle,” and at least 30 percent of firms must identify 
the constraint as a “major obstacle” or a “very severe obstacle”.  Both criteria identify the first 
eight constraints listed in Table 3 as binding, from “Tax Administration” to “Macroeconomic 
Instability”.  At the cut-off point there is a large drop, as while 34.4 percent of firms identify 
macroeconomic instability as a severe or major constraint, only 24.3 percent of firms provide 
the same answer for customs and trade regulations. Binding constraints are of more interest, 
because these constraints suggest the areas where reform could produce the most benefit.  It 
may be less effective to devote policy resources to areas where firms do not complain as 
loudly. We see that tax issues, financing issues, policy uncertainty, corruption, electricity, and 
macroeconomic  instability  produce  the  largest  concerns  for  firms.  Customs  and  trade 
regulations, anti-competitive practices, crime, land, labour and business regulations, the skills 
of the labour force, transportation, and telecommunications are not constraining firms to as 
large of degree.  In comparison, SMEDA (2006) identifies the business environment, access 
to finance, human resource development, and support for technology as four of the most 
important areas for SME policy. 
To  understand  the  nature  of  the  binding  constraints,  as  well  as  the  other 
constraints, we wish to determine what characteristics of a firm lead it to respond in a 
particular way. For example, it will be enlightening to know if small firms complain 
much more strongly than large firms about the access to financing.  The overwhelming 
benefit of our approach is that we can control for other firm characteristics to make these 
conclusions.  We will know that it is because firms are small that they answer in some 
particular way, and not because, for example, small firms tend to manufacture particular 
goods or be located in particular regions, and it is these other factors that are driving the 
firm’s response.   Such knowledge can guide policy-makers to design more appropriate 
policies responding to the specific needs of Pakistani firms. 
An  ordered  probit  model  provides  a  natural  approach  for  determining  the 
significance  of  particular  firm  characteristics  in  answering  about  the  degree  of  a 
constraint.  Our  dependent  variable,  the  measure  of  constraint  severity,  includes  five 
ordered categories.  Ordinary least squares is not appropriate because there is no reason 
to believe that the differences between categories will be equal. We cannot observe the 
true severity of a constraint, which we call variable y*.  Each of the ranking categories 
refers to a range of actual severity.  As the constraint grows for a firm, the constraint will 
reach  a  threshold  and  move  to  the  next  higher  category.   An  ordered  probit  model 
provides a way to model this phenomenon.  We seek to estimate: 
y
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In the above expression, y* is the unobserved true underlying severity of the 
constraint,  X  is  a  matrix  of  explanatory  variables,  y  is  the  observed  constraint 
ranking, and the  s are the unknown threshold values that cause firms to decide their 
answer  for  y.   We  consider  these  constraints  as  a  linear  function  of  firm 
characteristics X, which include size, location, export status, type of production, firm 
age, type of firm ownership. The ordered probit approach uses maximum likelihood 
to determine the role of the explanatory variables.  The value of using this approach 
is  that  it  allows  us  to  examine  whether  a  particular  firm  characteristic  results  in 
different answers about the severity of a constraint, after controlling for the effects of 
other explanatory variables.    
5.  ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTRAINTS ON BUSINESS 
The framework used in this paper explains the business constraints for firms in 
Pakistan along six specific firm characteristics, in order to provide the basis for a 
deeper  policy  discussion.   We  identify  those  characteristics  of  firms  that  produce 
statistically  significant  differences  in  their  answers  about  the  severity  of  business 
constraints.    The  main  emphasis  will  be  on  binding  constraints,  though  the 
discussion also includes limited analysis of other constraints.   Table 4 provides the 
results of the ordered probit regressions.  Tables 5 through 10 follow by showing the 
percentage  of  firms  identifying  a  constraint  as  “Major”  or  “Very  Severe,” 
disaggregated  by  a  particular  firm  characteristic.   These  tables  incorporate 
information from the ordered probit regression to identify which constraints produce 
statistically  significant  differences  in  the  responses  of  firms  disaggregated  by  the 
particular category.   These tables also identify the binding constraints as they apply 
to each of the firm characteristics.  
5.1.  Firm Size 
The relationship between firm size and business constraints has been studied in the 
literature.  Bari, et al. (2002) indicates that SMEs have generally faced greater challenges 
than  their  larger  counterparts  in  Pakistan’s  recent  history,  on  account  of  the  heavily 
regulated industrialisation policy.   Large firms held advantages because they were in 
better positions to obtain limited government licenses and investment incentives.  Large 
firms also had greater access to finance, because credit and interest rate controls left 
banks with little reason to loan to the riskier small firms.   Fixed costs in dealing with 
government regulators and administrators also worked to put a greater burden on smaller 
firms. 
After controlling for other firm characteristics, we find evidence that firm size 
matters at the 5 percent level of significance for the degree of constraint facing firms with 
regard to the binding constraints of tax issues, electricity, and access to financing (see 
Table 5).   
For  nonbinding  constraints,  firm  size  matters  for  crime  issues,  access  to  land, 
labour regulations, and telecommunications.   Interestingly, some issues do not produce 
answers that differ in a statistically significant way by firm size, including financing 
costs,  economic policy uncertainty,  corruption,  macroeconomic stability,  customs and 
trade regulations, anticompetitive practices, business licensing and operating permits,  Table 4 
Ordered—Probit of Constraints on Firm Characteristics 











































Firm Size (Omitted Condition is "Large Firm") 
  Overall p-value  0.0262*  0.0000**
 




0.4576  0.4582  0.5511  0.0281* 
   Micro Firm  –0.3593*  –0.6885**
 




0.0406  –0.1813  –0.0662  –0.4794**  
  Small Firm  –0.0505  –0.2306  0.1007  –0.2241  –0.0724  –0.0963  0.3091*  –0.1336  –0.3207**  –0.1132  –0.4399**  0.4326**
 
–0.2289  0.1661  –0.0821  0.0009  –0.2889*    
Medium Firm  0.0779  0.1293  0.0699  –0.3693**  0.0324  0.1854  0.2472  –0.2722*  –0.0934  –0.2969*  –0.5084**  0.3659*  –0.0411  0.0826  0.0497  –0.1498  –0.1464 
Province (Omitted Condtion is "Sindh") 
  Overall p-value  0.2201  0.0614  0.0488*  0.3255  0.5349  0.0009**  0.0000**  0.7189  0.0046**  0.2524  0.0051**  0.0000**
 
0.0606  0.0044**  0.0031**  0.0847  0.4223  
  NWFP  0.0487  –0.0337  –0.4426**  0.2507  –0.0295  0.1262  –0.7807**  –0.0359  0.1821  0.2933  –0.2071  –1.1439**
 
–0.3575*  –0.5160**  –0.5957**  –0.1399  –0.0882  
  Punjab  0.0225  –0.0557  –0.0772  0.0386  0.0145  –0.1789  –0.0516  –0.0846  –0.2300*  0.0398  –0.1398  –0.6174**
 
–0.0069  –0.1662  –0.0291  –0.1249  –0.1184  
  Balochistan  –0.2898  –0.4333**
 
–0.0365  0.1974  –0.2112  –0.5373**  –0.2206  –0.1544  –0.3041  –0.0287  0.3583*  –0.3523*
 
–0.2565  0.108  0.13  0.2355  –0.2591 
Exporter Status (Omitted Condition is "Non-exporter") 
  Overall p-value  0.0006**  0.0040**  0.0000**  0.8351  0.0070**  0.5582  0.0019**  0.2594  0.5369  0.0148*  0.2475  0.5844  0.0045**  0.0310*  0.7697  0.0662  0.2324  
  Exporter  –0.3774**  –0.3153**
 
–0.4774**  –0.0224  –0.2945**  –0.0611  –0.3331**  –0.1205  –0.0688  –0.2694*  –0.1299  0.06  –0.3178**
 
–0.2491*  0.0316  –0.2050  –0.1349 
Type of Production (Omitted Condition is "Textiles") 
  Overall p-value  0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0051**  0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0000**  0.6997  0.0000**  0.0009**  0.0361*  0.0125*  0.0018**   
Garments  –0.1331  –0.1706  –0.0739  0.0382  –0.1629  –0.1132  –0.1243  –0.01  0.0468  0.0763  0.0153  –0.0566  –0.0847  –0.1695  0.0043  0.0196  –0.2289 
  Leather  –1.4174**  –1.2257**
 
–0.8074**  –0.9682**  –0.8473**  –0.3121  –0.4312*  –0.554**  –0.7407**  –0.5382*  –0.6656**  –0.0068  –0.6226**
 
–0.5173*  0.1709  –0.2764  –0.6800**   
Food Proc.  0.2715*  0.1678  0.0597  0.037  0.2051  0.173  0.1119  –0.0571  0.0521  0.2609*  0.0785  –0.0058  0.0786  –0.1825  –0.3657**  –0.1675  0.0613 
  Electronics  –0.2885*  –0.6186**
 
–0.2631*  –0.3459**  –0.1074  –0.0337  –0.1637  –0.2516  –0.1942  0.0955  0.0897  0.1353  –0.3690**
 
–0.1598  0.0497  0.0402  0.074   
Chemicals  –0.0743  –0.0585  –0.0352  –0.051  0.0175  –0.064  –0.0073  –0.0217  0.1197  0.1684  0.0409  0.0666  0.1763  0.0056  0.0483  –0.1549  0.0413   
Sports Goods  –2.0439**  –1.4757**
 
–1.4185**  –1.3818**  –1.7798**  –0.6394**  –1.1207**  –1.108**  –1.0756**  –1.8205**  –2.1028**  –0.2388  –1.4861**
 
–1.1451**  –0.1175  –0.7372**  –0.6702** 
Firm Age (Omitted Condition is "0–5 Yr.") 
  Overall p-value  0.0041**  0.4788  0.4549  0.2875  0.7489  0.0588  0.4084  0.0030**  0.1080  0.1390  0.2605  0.0751  0.0636  0.2922  0.0821  0.821  0.3997   
6–10 Yr.  0.3014*  0.072  0.1276  0.2281  0.1174  0.1018  –0.0057  0.4813**  0.1571  0.144  0.219  –0.2240  0.0517  0.2393  0.0092  –0.1018  0.1919 
  11–15 Yr.  0.4611**  0.1849  0.2158  0.1375  0.1059  0.0189  0.148  0.3036*  0.3302*  0.2778*  0.0548  0.0205  0.2695  0.2414  0.1  –0.132  0.1445 
  Over 15 Yr.  0.4372**  0.1489  0.1678  0.2209  0.142  0.2444  0.0961  0.3908**  0.2053  0.2600  0.1008  –0.0411  0.0453  0.1495  –0.1449  –0.1014  0.2322 
Firm Ownership (Omitted Condition is "Sole Proprietorship") 
  Overall p-value  0.0012**  0.0238*  0.0000**  0.0266*  0.0007**  0.7831  0.0000**  0.0063**  0.0003**  0.0001**  0.0107*  0.0357*  0.0056**  0.0241*  0.0419*  0.0642  0.1099  
  Publicly Listed Co.  –0.017  –0.2847  0.3654*  –0.179  –0.0394  –0.1085  0.139  0.1768  0.1918  0.0574  –0.0071  0.177  0.302  0.5261*  0.4970*  0.5923**  0.3392  
  Private limited Co.  0.2956**  0.2125*  0.4876**  0.1221  0.1912*  0.0452  0.4302**  0.2292*  0.3579**  0.3391**  0.2018*  0.2521*  0.3472**  0.3102**  0.2655**  0.2479*  0.0914 
   Partnership  –0.0556  0.0261  0.2521*  –0.118  –0.2479*  0.0635  0.1727  –0.0694  –0.0316  –0.1128  –0.1589  0.0062  0.2180  0.155  0.2579*  0.1486  0.2769* 
   Other  –0.1323  –0.4054  –0.3793  0.6446  0.0254  –0.188  –0.1401  0.5688*  0.1121  0.4750  0.1043  0.2772  0.0951  0.4002  0.3401  0.468  0.2885 
Observations   953  954  953  954  953  954  953  953  948  954  953  953  954  952  953  953  952 
Note: * Significant at 5 percent; ** Significant at 1 percent.  Firm Heterogeneity and Constraints to Development  11
Table 5 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as  
“Major” or “Very Severe” by Firm Size   
Micro  Small  Medium  Large 
Tax Administration  34.9%  47.7%  53.2%  49.6% 
Tax Rates  29.4%  45.9%  59.6%  54.3% 
  Financing Costs (Int. Rates)  33.3%  45.5%  41.8%  44.2% 
  Economic Policy Uncertainty  41.3%  39.2%  38.3%  46.5% 
  Corruption  33.3%  39.4%  45.4%  45.0% 
Electricity  33.3%  38.9%  48.2%  38.0% 
  Access to Financing (Collateral)  33.3%  40.7%  39.0%  31.8% 
  Macro-economic Instability  27.8%  33.3%  34.0%  45.7% 
  Customs and Trade Regulations  13.5%  22.4%  30.5%  36.4% 
  Anti-competitive Practices  26.2%  21.5%  12.1%  26.4% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder  17.5%  19.7%  19.9%  33.3% 
Access to Land  16.7%  22.0%  23.4%  18.6% 
Labour Regulations  7.9%  14.3%  22.7%  22.5% 
  Business Permits  11.1%  15.4%  16.3%  13.2% 
  Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers  9.5%  12.2%  20.6%  11.6% 
  Transportation  10.3%  10.6%  7.1%  10.9% 
Telecommunications  6.3%  6.8%  6.4%  14.0% 
Note:  Own calculations from Pakistan ICA.  The constraint name is in boldface if the ordered probit analysis 
identifies statistically significant differences at the 5 percent level in the answers of firms varying by the 
firm characteristic.  The percentage is in boldface if the constraint is binding for the sub-category, where 
binding constraints are identified as those with a median response indicating the constraint is at least 
“Moderate”, and at least 30 percent of firms identify the constraint as “Major” or “Very Severe”.  
skills and education of the labour force, and transportation.  But regarding tax issues and 
electricity, medium firms express the strongest complaints, followed by large firms, small 
firms, and micro firms, once we control for other factors.  In fact, micro firms generally 
have fewer complaints, as their only binding constraints are financing costs and economic 
policy  uncertainty.   Meanwhile,  for  access  to  finance,  small  firms  complain  most, 
followed by medium, micro, and large firms.  
First consider the issues of tax administration and tax rates.  Micro firms complain 
about these issues much less than their larger counterparts.  In fact, tax issues are not a 
binding constraint for micro firms.  Regarding tax administration, the responses of small 
and medium firms are not statistically distinguishable from the responses of large firms.  
With regard to tax rates, we find evidence that micro and small firms do complain to a 
lesser degree in a statistically significant way, than do medium or large firms.  We can 
observe some justification for this through further exploration of the data along three 
parameters:  the  amount  of  entrepreneurial  time  spent  in  dealing  with  tax  regulators, 
average fines paid during a year, and average bribes paid to the regulators.   We find 
evidence  in  the  ICA  that  larger  firms  must  devote  significantly  more  resources  in 
absolute terms for dealing with taxation issues, while small firms are most burdened as a 
percentage of sales.   Micro firms can more easily escape the targets of the government 
tax authorities.     Moghal and Pfau  12
Access to financing is an important issue, as it is seventh in the list of binding 
constraints,  and  here  it  is  the  case  that  large  firms  complain  least  and  small  firms 
complain most.  Access to financing is only a binding constraint for small and medium 
firms.  In a topic deserving much greater attention, we indeed find evidence that firm size 
has a direct bearing on a firm’s ability to get financing from formal channels; larger firms 
enjoy easier and greater access to formal financing than their smaller counterparts in the 
ICA.   It is puzzling why micro firms do not voice loud complaints despite having the 
least access to formal financing though.  For example, more than half of large firms had 
at least one loan from a bank at the time of the survey, while this is true for only 2.3 
percent of micro firms.  There are several possible explanations.  Micro firms believe that 
they will not be entertained by the financial institutions, and hence they are discouraged 
to apply in the first place and then effectively find other sources of financing. Also, micro 
firms  assign  low  probability  to  their  survival  in  a  highly  uncertain  economic  policy 
environment  and  avoid  taking  any  additional  liabilities  in  the  absence  of  effective 
bankruptcy procedures. 
There  are  four  other  constraints  with  statistically  significant  differing  answers 
regarding firm size that are not binding in nature.  These are related to crime, access to 
land, labour regulations, and telecommunications. The most likely targets of theft and 
crimes  are  the  large  enterprises.  Limited  financial  resources  have  translated  into  the 
larger complaints by the micro, small and medium enterprises about the access to land. 
Unlike the usual perception that labour regulations are a real source of trouble for the 
smaller firms, see SMEDA (2002) and SMEDA (2004), our analysis suggests otherwise, 
as the bigger a firm is, the more it tends to complain about labour regulations. 
Revisiting the discussion above, our analysis suggests that conditions for the SME 
manufacturing sector in Pakistan can improve if reform efforts focus on: (a) improving 
both tax rates and tax administration to respond better to SMEs’ unique conditions, b) 
ensuring the supply of electricity from the national grid, and c) deepening the formal 
financing to reach out to smaller firms. To make the business environment even more 
conducive for micro and small manufacturers, giving access to land should be considered. 
However, any intervention in other areas is likely benefit larger enterprises more than the 
SMEs.  
5.2.  Firm Location 
Table 6 provides evidence that, after controlling for other firm characteristics, the 
province in which a firm is located affects its business constraints.  Firms in Sindh and 
NWFP tend to voice louder complaints than those in Punjab and Balochistan.  The subset 
of  binding  constraints  in  which  firm  location  plays  an  important  role  in  producing 
different responses, with at least 5 percent significance, include the cost of financing, 
electricity, and access to financing.  With regard to the costs of financing and access to 
financing,  the  complaints  are  loudest  in  Sindh,  though  the  responses  in  Punjab, 
Balochistan, and Sindh do not differ significantly from one another.  However, financing 
issues are an area in which complaints from NWFP are significantly lower, once we 
control  for  other  firm characteristics.   As  for  electricity,  the  degree  of  complaints  is 
significantly less in Balochistan than the other regions.  NWFP experiences the biggest 
problems with electricity, followed by Sindh and Punjab.  We find justification for this in  Firm Heterogeneity and Constraints to Development  13
Table 6 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as  
“Major” or “Very Severe” by Region   
Sindh  NWFP  Punjab  Balochistan 
Tax Administration  54.4%  56.6%  43.6%  39.3% 
Tax Rates  54.8%  59.2%  42.7%  39.3% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates)  50.6%  40.8%  40.3%  44.3% 
  Economic Policy Uncertainty  39.7%  56.6%  38.4%  41.0% 
  Corruption  41.4%  47.4%  39.4%  34.4% 
Electricity  43.5%  52.6%  38.8%  13.1% 
Access to Financing (Collateral)  46.4%  23.7%  36.9%  37.7%   
Macro-economic Instability  39.3%  40.8%  31.5%  34.4% 
Customs and Trade Regulations  28.5%  39.5%  20.9%  21.3% 
  Anti-competitive Practices  13.4%  39.5%  23.0%  14.8% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder  23.8%  15.8%  18.7%  42.6% 
Access to Land  38.1%  3.9%  16.3%  21.3% 
  Labour Regulations  16.7%  10.5%  16.6%  11.5% 
Business Permits  19.7%  5.3%  13.0%  23.0% 
Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers  12.1%  9.2%  12.6%  24.6% 
  Transportation  10.0%  11.8%  9.0%  18.0% 
  Telecommunications  7.5%  6.6%  7.6%  9.8% 
Note:  The Note in Table 5 explains how to interpret this table.    
the  survey,  as  the  median  percentage  of  merchandise  value  lost  due  to  electricity 
problems follows the same ordering.  In NWFP, the median firm estimates that it loses 5 
percent of its merchandise on account of electricity problems.  Because different regions 
have different experiences with electricity, there are grounds for a deeper analysis of the 
arrangement of electricity production and supply in the four regions. 
The regional location of firms also produces statistical significance for some non-
binding constraints as well.   For instance, customs and trade regulations are less of a 
problem in Balochistan and Punjab than in NWFP and Sindh.  Meanwhile, access to land 
is a bigger problem in Sindh than in other regions.   This constraint points to possible 
opportunities  for  substantially  improving  the  investment  climate  by  establishing  new 
industrial zones in Sindh.  Complaints about access to land are particularly low in NWFP 
once we control for other factors.   As for the issues of crime, business permits, and 
worker skills, Balochistan experiences the biggest problems, followed by Sindh, Punjab, 
and NWFP.     
5.3.  Access to Export Markets 
Exporting firms overwhelmingly have fewer complaints than firms serving only 
the domestic market, as shown in Table 7.   At the 5 percent level of significance, our 
analysis  regarding  market  access  has  confirmed  significantly  lower  complaints  for 
exporters with five of the eight binding constraints.  For the other constraints, exporters 
complain  less, but  not significantly less.  In general, exporters complain less with regard  Moghal and Pfau  14
Table 7 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as “Major”  
or “Very Severe”, by Market Access   
Non-exporters  Exporters 
Tax Administration  51.2%  29.2% 
Tax Rates  50.6%  30.3% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates)  47.2%  25.8% 
  Economic Policy Uncertainty  43.2%  28.1% 
Corruption  43.3%  27.0% 
  Electricity  41.4%  30.9% 
Access to Financing (Collateral)  42.1%  21.3% 
  Macro-economic Instability  37.0%  23.0% 
  Customs and Trade Regulations  25.5%  19.1% 
Anti-competitive Practices  23.1%  14.0% 
  Crime, Theft and Disorder  22.7%  15.2% 
  Access to Land  22.0%  16.9% 
Labour Regulations  17.0%  10.7% 
Business Permits  16.1%  8.4% 
  Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers  13.5%  10.7% 
  Transportation  11.0%  6.2% 
Note:  The Note in Table 5 explains how to interpret this table.    
to  tax  issues,  financing  issues,  and  experiences  with  corruption.   In  fact,  the  only 
constraint identified as binding by exporting firms in the survey is electricity.   As for 
non-binding  constraints,  exporters  complain  significantly  less  about  anti-competitive 
practices, labour regulations, and business permits.    
For practical reasons, exporting firms can complain less because they enjoy special 
incentive packages in areas such as taxation, financing, and other regulations.
4   Briefly, 
exporting firms are not required to pay sales tax (VAT), and income tax is governed by a 
presumptive tax regime, which allows exporters to settle their income tax liability by 
paying  tax  at  a  rate  ranging  between  0.75  percent  and  1.25  percent  of  sales.  This 
arrangement takes away both of the top ranking constraints for exporters, and it allows 
them to internalise the costs of taxation as a fixed operating cost. 
The arrangement for financing is also unique for exporters. The central bank of 
Pakistan allows exporters to have access to an export refinancing fund, available through all 
commercial banking channels without a requirement of furnishing any physical collateral. 
Additionally, the export refinancing rates are pegged to the average six-month Treasury bill 
rates plus a certain percentage for covering operational costs. This arrangement has allowed 
exporters to enjoy increased access to financing at the lowest possible market interest rates.  
There are some limitations, however, because commercial banks can occasionally demand 
additional collateral for riskier clients. Corruption and uncertainty about regulations and 
policy is also reduced because of lessened contact between exporters and regulators.   In 
general, our analysis confirms the effectiveness of said incentives resulting in relatively 
better scores from exporters against those constraints.   
4For details on incentives, please visit <www.tdap.gov.pk>.   Firm Heterogeneity and Constraints to Development  15
5.4.  Manufacturing Sub-sector 
Does the type of product a firm produces matter for its well-being in the Pakistani 
business environment?  Are some industries able to offer better investment opportunities than 
others? The answer to these questions is yes, as shown in Table 8. After controlling for other 
factors,  the  sub-manufacturing  industry  of  the  firm  is  an  important  determinant  of  its 
constraints.  In fact, overall responses are different at the sub-manufacturing level for all of the 
constraints  except  for  access  to  land.   Among  textiles,  garments,  leather  goods,  food 
processing, electronics, chemicals, and sports goods, business conditions in Pakistan tend to 
most favour the sports goods industry, followed by leather manufacturers and electronics 
manufacturers.  To be precise, the sports goods and leather goods industries do not experience 
any binding constraints.   Meanwhile, the food processing industry complains most loudly, 
though the responses from textiles, garments, and chemicals are also relatively close.    
Given these results, the industrial sectors can be classified in two groups based on their 
relative perceptions about the business environment. The first group comprises sports goods, 
leather goods, and electronics.  While sports goods and leather goods are well ahead, the case 
of electronics is more split, since they are better off than the textiles, garments, chemicals and 
food  processing  industries,  but  only  for  the  first  four  binding  constraints,  from  tax 
administration to economic policy uncertainty. For the rest of the binding constraints, from 
corruption to macroeconomic instability, their experience is no different.  
The second group includes textiles, garments, chemicals, and food processing.  It 
is interesting that textile and garment manufacturers voice loud complaints.   SMEDA 
(2005) and the World Bank (2004a) predict declining returns for the textile and garment 
industries  in  Pakistan,  with  regard  to  the  abolition  of  textile  quotas  and  increased 
competition from other regional players, such as India, Bangladesh, and China.   Food 
processing firms voice the loudest complaints, though tax administration is the only area 
which has any statistical significance for this sector, besides anticompetitive practices in 
the list of nonbinding constraints. On the other hand, in terms of the availability of skilled 
labour, food processing is the only industry which enjoys better conditions. 
The  survey  results  identify  issues  which  have  direct  bearing  on  the  industrial 
policy of Pakistan. The results imply potential opportunities for improving investment 
conditions  substantially  for  the  textiles,  garments,  chemicals  and  food  processing 
industries by placing them at the core of possible future industrial policy. Given the fresh 
investment by the textile and the garment sectors to the tune of USD 4 billion, it is all the 
more important to understand reasons for the differences at the sub-manufacturing level 
for evolving a more conducive business environment.  
5.5.  Firm Age 
It is interesting that firm age is not an important factor for determining how firms 
view potential business constraints, once we control for other factors (see Table 9).  The 
only  two  constraints  with  differential  responses  are  tax  administration  and 
macroeconomic instability.  With regard to tax administration, the largest constraints are 
felt by firms between 11 and 15 years old, while the young firms are least affected again.  
As for macroeconomic stability, the youngest firms are least affected; macroeconomic 
stability is not a binding constraint for firms between 0 and 5 years old.   The biggest 
complaints come from firms between 6 and 10 years old.   Table 8 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as “Major” or “Very Severe”, by Industry   
Textiles  Garments  Leather 
Food 
Processing  Electronics  Chemicals 
Sports 
Goods 
Tax Administration  51.2%  49.3%  7.5%  62.9%  38.6%  50.0%  2.2% 
Tax Rates  53.5%  50.7%  7.5%  62.3%  25.7%  51.4%  2.2% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates)  47.7%  41.9%  10.0%  54.3%  37.6%  48.6%  2.2% 
Economic Policy Uncertainty  43.9%  41.9%  15.0%  51.7%  32.7%  42.8%  4.3% 
Corruption  43.3%  35.3%  10.0%  52.3%  39.6%  46.4%  2.2% 
Electricity  42.4%  33.8%  17.5%  53.6%  37.6%  37.7%  15.2% 
Access to Financing (Collateral)  42.7%  33.8%  17.5%  47.0%  36.6%  40.6%  4.3% 
Macro-economic Instability  38.9%  38.2%  10.0%  39.7%  26.7%  37.7%  0.0% 
Customs and Trade Regulations  22.8%  30.9%  7.5%  30.5%  19.8%  30.4%  2.2% 
Anti-competitive Practices  16.4%  18.4%  12.5%  31.1%  30.7%  28.3%  2.2% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder  20.5%  18.4%  7.5%  25.2%  24.8%  30.4%  0.0% 
  Access to Land  26.3%  20.6%  0.0%  21.9%  19.8%  18.1%  10.9% 
Labour Regulations  14.9%  16.2%  5.0%  21.2%  8.9%  25.4%  0.0% 
Business Permits  17.0%  14.0%  7.5%  15.9%  11.9%  16.7%  2.2% 
Skills and Education of Avail. Workers  15.2%  14.0%  12.5%  7.3%  12.9%  15.9%  4.3% 
Transportation  10.8%  10.3%  5.0%  11.9%  8.9%  11.6%  0.0% 
Telecommunications  7.3%  5.1%  2.5%  8.6%  11.9%  10.9%  0.0% 
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Table 9 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as “Major”  
or “Very Severe”, by Firm Age   
0-5 Years  6-10 Years  11-15 Years
 
Over 15 Years 
Tax Administration  42.7%  48.4%  50.9%  44.7% 
Tax Rates  43.8%  49.1%  46.0%  46.4% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates)  37.5%  46.3%  45.1%  40.9% 
Economic Policy Uncertainty  39.6%  42.5%  39.4%  39.5% 
Corruption  36.5%  40.0%  41.2%  40.9% 
Electricity  38.5%  36.5%  36.3%  44.1% 
Access to Financing (Collateral)  33.3%  38.6%  40.7%  37.8% 
Macro-economic Instability  26.0%  38.9%  34.1%  33.1% 
Customs and Trade Regulations  18.8%  22.8%  27.4%  25.1% 
Anti-competitive Practices  17.7%  18.2%  25.7%  22.2% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder  15.6%  23.9%  22.6%  19.9% 
Access to Land  19.8%  15.8%  23.5%  24.2% 
Labour Regulations  12.5%  14.0%  18.6%  16.4% 
Business permits  10.4%  15.8%  15.0%  14.7% 
Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers  13.5%  14.0%  17.3%  9.2% 
Transportation  14.6%  8.8%  9.3%  10.4% 
Telecommunications  8.3%  8.1%  7.1%  7.5% 
Note:  The Note in Table 5 explains how to interpret this table.   
As for why young firms complain the least, the answer may be related to survey 
bias in the ICA sample.   As an illustration of this bias, a sample of 279 manufacturing 
firms from Directories of Labour Year Book 2000, Karachi—Government of Sindh, were 
contacted one year after publication, and it was discovered that some 85 businesses were 
either closed or not traceable. This suggests a degree of severity in business conditions 
for new entrants that cannot be picked up entirely in the sample due to the lag between 
obtaining sources for choosing the sample and actually interviewing the selected firms.    
5.6.  Ownership Structure 
Previous analysis, such as SMEDA (2002), indicates that ownership structure does 
matter for the development and the growth of a firm. Ideally, more formalised structures 
should lead to better business services delivery from the business support institutions and 
should result in better business conditions for firms.   This is not the only possibility, 
however,  as  Osama  (2004)  suggests  that  corporatisation  provides  no  additional 
advantages for taxes, access to business support services, or financing.  Instead, a limited 
liability structure is more expensive on account of tax rates and fixed operational costs 
associated with additional paper work.  
The survey shows that firm ownership structure is very important in determining 
the  degree  of  constraint  reported  by  businesses.   Table  10  shows  that  ownership  is 
statistically significant for all binding constraints except for electricity.   Private limited 
companies  report  the  largest  complaints  for  all  of  the  statistically  significant  binding 
constraints.   Private  limited  companies  and  sole  proprietors  are  only  comparable  for 
economic policy uncertainty and electricity.  On the other hand, publicly listed companies 
have  lesser  complaints  than  the  sole  proprietary  concerns  for  most  of  the  binding 
constraints.  In  cases  where  publicly  listed  companies claim a higher degree of binding  Moghal and Pfau  18
Table 10 
Percentage of Firms Identifying Constraint as “Major”  






Liability  Partnership  Sole Proprietorship
 
Tax Administration  40.6%  57.6%  29.9%  39.1% 
Tax Rates  40.6%  57.4%  33.5%  36.4% 
Financing Costs (Int. Rates)  34.4%  52.9%  34.1%  33.2% 
Economic Policy Uncertainty  34.4%  44.2%  26.9%  41.1% 
Corruption  34.4%  48.4%  24.0%  36.8% 
  Electricity  40.6%  42.4%  38.9%  34.0% 
Access to Financing (Collateral)  21.9%  45.9%  31.7%  30.8% 
Macro-economic Instability  40.6%  40.1%  25.1%  27.7% 
Customs and Trade Regulations  28.1%  31.9%  15.0%  15.0% 
Anti-competitive Practices  21.9%  25.3%  10.2%  20.6% 
Crime, Theft and Disorder  21.9%  27.2%  14.4%  14.6% 
  Access to Land  18.8%  25.7%  13.8%  17.0% 
Labour Regulations  21.9%  18.3%  15.0%  11.1% 
Business Permits  12.5%  16.3%  12.0%  13.4% 
Skills and Educ. of Avail. Workers  12.5%  15.0%  11.4%  9.9% 
Transportation  15.6%  12.3%  5.4%  7.5% 
  Telecommunications  15.6%  8.8%  6.0%  5.5% 
Note:  The Note in Table 5 explains how to interpret this table.    
constraint,  which  include  cost  of  financing,  access  to  finance,  and  macroeconomic 
instability, the results are not statistically significant.  Firm ownership continues to play a 
statistically significant role in explaining the responses to seven of the nine nonbinding 
constraints.   Again, in these cases, the complaints of private limited companies are the 
largest  by  a  statistically  significant  degree.   The  complaints  of  sole  proprietorships, 
publicly listed companies, and partnerships follow, but are generally not distinguishable 
from one another, except for the case of workforce skills, where sole proprietorships 
complain significantly less. 
The survey data confirms the fact that privately held companies spend more days 
dealing with regulators and pay more to government regulators in terms of fines and 
bribes.   Being a corporate entity in Pakistan does not offer any incentives in terms of 
dealing with tax authorities, qualifying for better tax rates, negotiating lower interest rates 
or  better  access  to  finance,  dealing  with  corruption,  or  fighting  macroeconomic 
instability.  Sole proprietary concerns can more easily escape from regulatory oversight 
without losing any advantages in terms of access to business services or resources.  This 
has  important  implications  for  developing  the  formal  economy  of  Pakistan,  and  not 
letting  firms  slip  into  the  informal  economy.   The  State  Bank  of  Pakistan  (2001) 
estimates that the informal economy was close to 32 percent of the total between 1996 
and 2000.  The magnitude of the informal economy makes it difficult for the government 
to adequately plan and provide effective business services. As we understand, it has its 
roots  in  ownership  structure  of  the  firms  and  any  effort  to  improve  conditions  for 
privately held firms will help to improve the investment climate. Firm Heterogeneity and Constraints to Development  19
6.  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This study confirms that a one-size-fits-all policy is not appropriate for improving 
the  conditions  of  Pakistan’s  manufacturing  firms.   A  number  of  different  firm 
characteristics  are  found  to  play  important  roles  in  determining  business  constraints.  
First, while existing research, such as SMEDA (2002) and SMEDA (2004), discusses 
firm growth vis-à-vis firm size, it does not recognise a need for different mechanical 
processes  based  on  firm size.   The  analysis  of  responses  in  this  research  sketches  a 
different  picture.  While  confirming  heterogeneity  with  regard  to  the  aforementioned 
constraints, the results suggest that smaller firms are better off in quantitative terms. The 
efforts  of  the  smaller  firms  and  micro  firms  in  particular  are  devoted  in  escaping 
regulatory burden, using bribes and gifts to regulators as a tool. Large firms tend to use 
similar tools for reducing their official tax liabilities and remain within the regulatory 
environment. This difference in approach to dealing with regulatory burden requires a 
different policy treatment for ironing out the variations of firm size in the regulatory 
environment. This would also require the development of different mechanical processes 
based on firm size. Access to finance comes out as the top-ranking constraint for the 
small firms, where the difference is both wide and significant. Using Non-bank Financial 
Institutions (NBFI) as a channel for small firms would greatly improve their condition 
(please see Table 11 for a summary of policy recommendations).  
Additionally, certain regional locations in Pakistan are posing an extra burden on 
firms due to the lack of necessary infrastructure such as electricity and industrial land, 
which becomes binding constraints to their growth. Most of the significantly differing 
responses,  though,  come  from  the  list  of  non-binding  constraints.  An  appropriate 
response  to  remove  these  barriers  would  include  that  the  government  yield  modest 
resources  in  terms  of  setting  up  new  industrial  parks  with  adequate  infrastructural 
support.  
Meanwhile, exporting firms face only a few binding constraints. The difference in 
the condition of non-exporters and exporters are stark and significant, and incentives for 
exporters  with  respect  to  most  of  the  regulations  are  creating  another  divide  among 
industrial enterprises. While the incentive regime for exporters is effective and results in 
fewer complaints, it needs to be counterbalanced with a business support mechanism for 
non-exporters to smooth differences.  
Furthermore,  there  are  definitely  some  industries  which  enjoy  relatively  better 
regulatory environments than others. Sports and leather goods industries complain least. 
The specific conditions surrounding these industries could give clues for making life 
better for others. The results in this respect also pose doubts about the effectiveness of 
industrial policies for creating better conditions. It appears that they are distorting the 
business environment whereby some industries like food processing are becoming worse 
off  without  bettering  conditions  for  others.   Current  industrial  policy  should  be 
pragmatically reviewed.  
Among the surviving enterprises, older firms do not enjoy any extra advantage, 
despite prevailing popular beliefs.  On the contrary, older firms are penalised in terms of 
tax administration. This suggests that tax regulators go after obvious targets regardless of 
their  compliance  record.  This  underlying  psychology  of  the  regulator  explains  firms’ 
general preference for tax evasion.  Moghal and Pfau  20
Table 11 
Policy Analysis of Firm Conditions vis-à-vis Constraints 
Policy Area  Analysis/ Challenges/ Policy Focal Points 
Reducing interface between tax regulators and firms will reduce compliance costs for 
all but micro sized firms  
Only a responsive tax regime for smaller size firms (micro and small) can improve 
business conditions—analysis confirmed that smaller firms end up paying more (as a 
percentage of sales) to avoid interface with tax authorities 
Access to finance is a binding constraint for small size firms—survey results show that 
Non-bank Financial Institutions are more effective than the commercial banks 
Increasing access to land can significantly improve the business climate for SMEs 
Firm Size 
Labour regulations are not a constraint for SMEs, reducing interface of labour 
regulators is desired more by large firms 
Firms in Sindh and NWFP tend to voice the loudest complaints 
Cost of financing, electricity, and access to financing and industrial land are the key 
areas for improvement in Sindh 
In NWFP major complaints are about economic policy uncertainty, electricity supply 
and taxation 
Regional Location 
The major concern in Balochistan is the prevailing law and order situation 
Non-exporters generally feel deprived 
The incentive regime for exporters is effective resulting in fewer complaints 
The difference in the conditions of non-exporting and exporting firms are stark 
Market Access  
(Local and Foreign) 
In order to avoid another divide in the economy, the incentive structure must be 
counterbalanced through other business support mechanisms for non-exporting firms 
The business or investment conditions across industries are significantly different 
Sports goods, leather goods and electronics industries enjoy relatively better 
investment conditions.  Indeed, the first two do not experience binding constraints 
Returns are declining in textiles, garments and chemical industries—due to fierce 
foreign competition 
The food processing industry produces the most complaints, particularly about tax 
administration and anti-competitive practices 
Sub-manufacturing 
Sector 
Industrial and investment policies must carefully look into the incentives for different 
industries 
Analysis does not confirm any particular advantage related to the age of the firm, 
except that old firms are more exposed to taxation-related problems 
It is reasonable to conclude that the existing business climate does not encourage new 
start-ups. 
Firm Age  
Privately held limited liability companies face large compliance costs 
There is no added advantage to be a corporate entity in terms of taxation, finance, or in 
accessing business services or resources 
Ownership Structure
 
Sole proprietary firms do not show any disadvantage or advantage over publicly held 
companies or partnerships but are definitely better off than privately held limited 
liability companies 
There are constraints that are significant for many types of firms, such as electricity 
supply from public grid, macroeconomic stability, and law and order  
A more reliable power supply from public grid has the largest potential to improve 
growth conditions across the board 




An improved law and order situation would greatly enhance firms’ ability to grow and 
plan for long-term investments 
 
 Firm Heterogeneity and Constraints to Development  21
Finally, we establish that more formal structures of organising businesses, such as 
privately held limited liability companies, can also be punishing to firms. The current 
regulatory environment in Pakistan is killing the incentives for formal business structure 
and becoming a liability for business. 
Conclusively,  evidence  is  found  that  economic  policy  reforms  in  Pakistan 
cannot treat firms as homogeneous units.   A great amount of heterogeneity exists, 
and  this  heterogeneity  can  drive  many  different  responses  to  questions  about  the 
severity  of  business  constraints.  For  instance,  fashioning  an  effective  business 
climate for micro firms will entail different policies than for small, medium, or large 
firms.  Additionally, we find that access to foreign markets, type of production, and 
type of firm ownership play substantial roles in determining business responses to 
constraints.   The age of the firm is less important, as is the province in which the 
firm is located.   Some issues are cross-cutting across firms, such as a desire for a 
more reliable electricity supply, but generally the results suggest that policy-makers 
must develop proposals that account for the heterogeneity of firms, and that a one-
size-fits-all  approach  will  not  be  effective  and  could  even  have  unintended 
consequences.  
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